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Abstrat
Using game and probability theories, I study the Frenh popular
game 421, a perfet information stohasti stage game. The prob-
lem is to nd strategies maximizing the probability of some expeted
utility. I only solve a player's round against providene, a problem
of fate stohasti management: beyond the bakward indution solu-
tion, bounded omplexity motivates heuristi poliies. For a unique
goal utility, a simple optimal poliy, rathet, is obtained. Its result
probabilities are ompiled and used, for arbitrary utilities, as the logi
of goal identiation poliies. Various poliies appear, lose to hu-
man behavior, and are exatly evaluated by solving the Kolmogorov
equation.
k. w.: stohasti management, Kolmogorov equation, bounded om-
plexity, human behavior.
JEL C61, C63, C73. MSC: 60J20, 65K05, 90B50, 91A15, 93E20.
1
CONTENTS 2
Contents
1 Aim and interest of the study 3
2 Bakward indution optimal poliy 4
2.1 Alea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Fate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Optimal strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Fate as a stohasti proess 10
3.1 The Kolmogorov equation on expeted utility . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 The Fokker-Plank equation on presene density . . . . . . . . 11
3.3 Computing result probabilities by duality . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4 Analogy with linear transport theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Simple optimal poliies for one-goal utilities 14
4.1 The rathet and Bernoulli poliies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 Optimal one-goal strategy result probabilities . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Goal identiation programming 17
5.1 Motivation: bounded omplexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2 Redued horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3 Dynami programming and goal revision . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.4 Poliy benhmark and interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6 Conlusions 22
A The (tentative) rules of 421 23
B A Galton-Watson proess in the 421 round 25
C Realization with mathematia 26
1 AIM AND INTEREST OF THE STUDY 3
1 Aim and interest of the study
Following [1℄, I look for strategies, maximizing the probability of win, or
some expeted utility, in the game 421 ombining hane and deision (see
appendix A).
By the way, or, indeed, by serendipity, I enounter the problem of fate
stohasti management : optimizing today's deisions, with respet to a fu-
ture utility, and in spite of tomorrow's odds. Suh issues as what are the
optimal poliies, in what irumstanes, and how muh they demand on
intelletual resoures, an be resolved mathematially, suggesting that man-
agement ould be an exat siene (as part of operations researh).
A lottery is not a game, in the sense of game theory, but a stohasti
proess (a sequene of random variables). Game theory treats lassially
multiple player deision games, the arhetype of whih is hess. A game
in whih players' fates depend on both hane and their deisions, like 421
and bakgammon [2℄, is a stohasti game [3℄. Chane makes deision more
omplex. For example, onsider a variation on hess: the player proposes
a list of n moves, the atual one being determined by asting die. n = 1
yields the standard pure deision game; n = n1, where n1 is the number of
possible moves, yields a pure hane game; n ≈ n1/2 yields a game of hane
and deision, more omplex than the former and the latter.
Game theory primarily fouses on the existene proofs for optimal strate-
gies. However, usable tehniques for obtaining pratial answers also mat-
ter [4, 1.1℄. Indeed, little an be done from existene without onstrution:
this is the old debate around Zermelo's axiom of hoie. Hene the interest
of investigating, as in Churh's thesis [5℄, alulability, the existene of an
algorithmi solution. But even alulability may not be suient for atual
omputation. For example, onsider again hess, a nite but very large game:
the algorithmi solution provided by the Zermelo theorem [6, h. 6℄ is of no
pratial use (until the nal moves), as notied by [7, 11.4℄, as it exeeds the
apaity of any omputer. The study of nite games does not stop with Zer-
melo theorem, and this is beause of omplexity boundedness. Algorithms
shall be ompared not only with respet to optimality (degree of ompletion
of the task) but also omplexity, using a bit of omplexity theory [5℄.
An algorithm is haraterized by its optimality, size and omputing time
on a given omputer, speialized by high-level funtions and data. The algo-
rithm may be good or bad, short or long, fast or slow. The three qualities and
quantities are not independent: the exhange of omputing time against size
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is the priniple of data ompression, the exhange of omputing time against
optimality is the priniple of heuristis. When setting two quantities, the
minimum of the third one, as a funtion of other impliit parameters, an
be dened: the minimum size and the minimum omputing time are respe-
tively related with the Kolmogorov omplexity and the Bennett logial depth
[5℄.
For strategy-generating algorithms, or deiding algorithms, or poliies,
optimality is the expeted utility. For a perfet information stage game, it is
interesting, for possible extensions, to haraterize the asymptoti behavior
of the omputing time, when the depth tends to innity, i. e. to know
whether the algorithm is linear or polynomial, rather than exponential, as
feared from the tree struture of the game.
The present study is thus an oasion to relate with eah other, on a
live ase, various tools and onepts attahed to games, proesses, probabil-
ities, ontrol, programming, algorithmis and omplexity, with appliations
in management and game pratie.
2 Bakward indution optimal poliy
A stohasti game redues to a pure deision game, by onsidering providene
as a partiular player [8, h. 4℄, whose mixed strategy, known a priori, results
from usual statistial postulates (independene, stationarity) and annot be
optimized.
1
421, thus redued, and with some preautions on the rules (ap-
pendix A), is a perfet information nite game and the Zermelo theorem
applies.
I will solve only a sub-game, the player's round against providene (while
other players stand still), a stohasti management problem, featuring a mar-
tingale problem and, for the rst player, a stopping time problem [9℄. The
analogy with Brownian motion provides statistial mehanis tools.
2.1 Alea
Let D ∈ N be the number of die, normally 3, and F ∈ N∗ the number of
faes of every die, normally 6. Die are disernible
2
, so that the probability
1
Probability theory began as the study of the providential strategy in hane games,
at the time of Bayes or the Bernoullis.
2
Disernibility is not an innouous hypothesis, as shown by Gibbs' paradox [10℄.
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spae is the set of fae sequenes, or arrangements. The lass of arrange-
ments orresponding to eah other by a permutation is a ombination, e. g.,
nénette, 221, is the subset of arrangements {(1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 1)}, of
redundany three. In 421, whih die produed whih fae does not matter,
beause ranking depends only on ombination.
I desribe the die system as in statistial mehanis: eah die is a parti-
le, with only one phase variable, fae. The laws of mehanis are replaed
by usual statistial hypothesis, abstrating hane from any spei random
generator. The system is desribed, in Lagrangian notation, by a fae om-
bination, or, in Eulerian notation, by the sequene df of oupation numbers
of every fae f = 1 . . . F , e. g. the Lagrangian notation 421 translates into
the Eulerian notation (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) (F = 6).
The interest of Eulerian notation lies in that the set of Eulerian ombi-
nations
d = (df)f=1...F .
is the partially ordered normed vetor spae ZF . The anoni basis eg =
(δf,g)f is aligned with brelans, ombinations with all faes of a kind. I
dene the ball
B(D ∈ N) ≡ {d ∈ ZF , |d| ≤ D}
and similarly (replaing ≤ above by = or < ) the sphere ∂B(D) and the
open ball B˘(D). The intersetions with the positive one are represented
by + exponents; the set of atual ombinations is B+(D). The norm of a
ombination is the sum of Eulerian omponent absolute values. The norm
of a positive ombination is just its number of die. The anoni order ≤,
partial on ZF , diers from the hierarhi order  (54), total on ∂B+(D).
Distint asts are independent and the probability of any fae to be on
top is 1/F (unloaded die). The arrangements of one ombination are thus
equiprobable, and the probability of a ombination is just that of any of its
arrangements, times the ombination redundany. For example, the prob-
ability of obtaining the ombination 21 is 2/F 2, while the probability of
obtaining the ombination 11 is 1/F 2. More generally, the probability of
obtaining the ombination d, after one ast, is given by the multinomial law,
with usual notations generalizing power and fatorial to integer vetors:
p(d) = pd
|d|!
d!
,p =
1
F
(1 . . . 1) ∈ QF ,
∑
d∈∂B+(D)
p(d) = 1. (1)
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2.2 Fate
For all j ∈ N, let the state dj be the ombination, aumulated after j asts,
and the event dj+1/2 be the ombination, obtained from the j + 1-th ast.
Fate is the innite state and event alternate sequene
ϕ ≡ (d0,d1/2,d1,d3/2 . . . ). (2)
The integer or half-integer index is used as a disrete time, integer time for
states, half-integer for events. The set of possible fates is desribed by the
fate tree, where branhing represents hane (from integer time to half-integer
time) or deision (onversely).
The rules of 421 imply:
d0 ≡ 0, (3)
∀j ∈ N,dj+1/2 ∈ B
+(Dj ≡ D − |dj |), (4)
0 ≤ dj+1 − dj ≤ dj+1/2, (5)
∃(j ∈ N, j ≤ J),dj ∈ B
+(D), (6)
where J ∈ N is the maximum round duration, normally 3. Dj is the number
of live die, whih have not been aumulated after j events and one state.
From (3, 6), D0 = D,DJ = 0.
From (4, 5),
Dj+1 ≤ Dj, (7)
(dj+1 − dj = dj+1/2) ⇔ dj+1 ∈ B
+(D). (8)
The eetive round duration J1 is the minimum of j in (6). The next
players' eetive round durations must equal the rst player's. Therefore,
for all players,
∀(j ∈ N, j < J1),dj ∈ B˘
+(D) , dj+1/2 6= 0, (9)
dJ1 ∈ B
+(D) , (10)
∀(j ∈ N, j > J1),dj−1/2 = 0 , dj = dJ1 . (11)
(9, 10) are used, rstly, after the rst player's end of round, to determine
J1, subsequently, as additional rules for next players. When j inreases, the
state vetor dj moves in the positive ball, o the origin, towards its boundary
where it gets stuk at dJ1 , the round result. Fate is virtually ontinued by an
innite sequene, asymptotially alternating the result and the null event.
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2.3 Utility
Following von Neumann and Morgenstern [7, h. 27℄, a player's utility is a
number, given by a ausal funtion, i. e. a funtion of history (past fate),
ompatible with the player's preferenes, and suh that the utility before
a random event is just the expeted utility, i. e. the probability-weighted
utility average, over possible outomes. Thus, expeted utility is anti-ausal,
i. e. presribing utilities at some future time determines its expetation at
all prior times.
One never knows when a game atually stops, as a it is often embedded
in a larger game. Tennis is a familiar example: a tennis game is a sub-
game of a set, itself a sub-game of a math, tournament, ranking system . . .
this asade does not even stop with a player's life, beause of ooperation
between individuals. But, if we want to obtain any result, we must stop
somewhere in the game asade, and judge utility more or less empirially.
(Quite similarly, in mehanis or thermodynamis, the studied system is
oupled with the rest of the world, by an often deliate boundary or ut-o
ondition.)
The study of 421 should stop at end of game, by setting players' utilities,
for example, a binary utility: one for win, zero for loss, or inorporating
eonomy, à la Bernoulli, the logarithm of earning divided by wealth [11℄.
However, I treat only the round. At end of round, the Bernoulli formula does
not make sense and utility is not given diretly by the rules (in partiular,
the transfer funtion of table 5). By examining the rules, a few properties
of utility are obtained; for example, at onstant time, for a rational player,
utility must be ompatible with the hierarhi order (54), et.
But I will not further haraterize utility. On the ontrary, I will onsider
the round independently of the rest of the game, with arbitrary utilities, in
order to treat the problem of fate stohasti management in a rather general
way.
For all fate ϕ (2), utility is judged at some time Jϕ, either integer or half-
integer in general (in the round, Jϕ ∈ {1/2, 3/2, 5/2}), as a ausal funtion:
u(d0,d1/2 . . .dJϕ) ∈ Q. (12)
The funtion u has a variable number of arguments, formally, it is dened
on
⋃
j∈N∗ B
+(D)j. Utility is judged forever:
u(. . .dJϕ, .) ≡ u(. . .dJϕ). (13)
2 BACKWARD INDUCTION OPTIMAL POLICY 8
The rules (4, 5, 6, 9, 10) are superseded by −∞ utilities for rule breaking
histories (exluding heating). In partiular, the utilitarian version of (4) is
∀(j ∈ N,dj+1/2 /∈ B
+(Dj)), u(. . .dj ,dj+1/2) = −∞ (14)
and the next players' round duration onditions (9, 10) beome
∀(j ∈ N, j < J1,dj ∈ ∂B
+(D)), u(. . .dj) = −∞. (15)
2.4 Optimal strategies
The greatest utility, drawn from any event-terminated history, is
∀j ∈ N, u(. . .dj ,dj+1/2) = max
dj+1
u(. . .dj ,dj+1/2,dj+1), (16)
u(.) = max
d1
u(.,d1). (17)
The latter equation, where d1 is a dummy variable, is a more formal expres-
sion of the former. The nature of the dummy variable is shown by its index
(state for integer, event for half-integer). The set of states, orresponding to
optimal deisions, is
Su(.) ≡ argmax
d1
u(.,d1). (18)
A player's mixed strategy onsists in hoosing randomly between many
deisions, aording to a ausal probability law,
d 7→ P (.,d) ≡ P(d1 = d|.),
∑
d1
P (.,d1) = 1. (19)
P(X) means the probability of the event X . The optimal mixed strategies
are suh that the support of the probability law (19) is a subset of Su(.)
(among them are pure optimal strategies).
From the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem,
u(.) =
∑
d1/2
p(.,d1/2)u(.,d1/2). (20)
where p is a ausal probability law, expressing the providential strategy and
rules. Beause of utility onditions, suh as (14, 15), there are, in (20),
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produts p× u of the undetermined form 0×∞, whih ought to be replaed
by zero (or the summation ought to be properly restrited).
Combining (17, 20), or onversely,
u(.) = max
d1
∑
d3/2
p(.,d3/2)u(.,d1,d3/2), (21)
u(.) =
∑
d1/2
p(.,d1/2)max
d1
u(.,d1/2,d1). (22)
The omposition of max−moy operations names the algorithm, whih is
the lassial zero-sum game max−min, where the rational opponent has
been replaed by neutral providene. (21, 22) are onsistent with (13): after
the judgment, they simply repeat the utility forever, so that the max−moy
operations an be hained ad innitum, no matter the end of round. Thus,
the judgment an be arbitrarily postponed, without aeting strategy. If
judgment times have an upper bound (e. g. the number of fates is nite),
then all judgments an be postponed until a (olletive) last judgment a time
J ∈ N, J ≥ max Jϕ, e. g. the maximum round duration.
Relaxing the rule (3), and taking d0 as a parameter, the problem of fate
management, i. e. nding optimal strategies, is self-similar under time-
shifts, exept for the parameter renormalization (as in statistial physis)
(D0, J,d0, (. . .dj), (p, u)(.))→ (Dj , J − j,dj , (), (p, u)(. . .dj , .)). (23)
Let χV be the harateristi funtion of V ⊂ B(D). The round providen-
tial strategy is determined by (1) and
p(.,d0,d1/2) ≡ p(d1/2)χ∂B+(D0)(d1/2). (24)
The expeted utility is omputed with (17, 20), from the last judgment bak-
ward in time:
u(. . .dJ−1,dJ−1/2), u(. . .dJ−1) . . . u(d0,d1/2,d1), u(d0,d1/2), u(d0), (25)
e. g., for J = 3, and using (24),
u(. . .d3/2) = max
d2
∑
d5/2∈∂B+(D2)
p(d5/2)u(. . .d3/2,d2,d5/2),
u(d0,d1/2) = max
d1
∑
d3/2∈∂B+(D1)
p(d3/2)u(d0,d1/2,d1,d3/2).
u(d0) =
∑
d1/2∈∂B+(D0)
p(d1/2)u(d0,d1/2).
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3 Fate as a stohasti proess
For a given strategy, what is the presene density (of the die system in a
subset of phase spae)? What is the expetation of an arbitrary utility, for
whih the given strategy is not neessarily optimal?
3.1 The Kolmogorov equation on expeted utility
Fate is a stohasti proess, not only beause it ontains random events (the
probability law p), but also random deisions, aording to mixed strategies
(the probability law P ). For any ausal proess like (2), the sequene of
histories
(d0), (d0,d1/2), (d0,d1/2,d1) . . .
is a disrete Markov hain, for whih lassial results are available [12, h. 6℄,
[13, h. 15℄, originating mostly from Brownian motion studies [10, h. 15℄.
The fate stohasti evolution equation, the Langevin equation, is just a
random sum, obeying (4, 5):
dj+1 = dj + dˆj+1,
P(dˆj+1 = d| . . .dj ,dj+1/2) = P (. . .dj ,dj+1/2,dj + d),
P(dj+1/2 = d| . . .dj) = p(. . .dj ,d).
dˆj+1 is a random soure term, onditioned by history, aording to the mixed
strategies P, p. dj undergoes a strategy-driven Brownian motion as, for ex-
ample, a harged Brownian partile driven by eletrophoresis.
The Chapman-Kolmogorov equation yields the probability of transition,
or jump, from one state to the other, in one time step:
σ(.,d0 y d1) ≡ P(d1 = d|.,d0) =
∑
d1/2
p(.,d0,d1/2)P (.,d0,d1/2,d). (26)
Let P be a player's mixed strategy, possibly not optimal. From the von
Neumann-Morgenstern theorem, twie applied,
u(.,d0) =
∑
d1/2
p(.,d0,d1/2)
∑
d1
P (.,d0,d1/2,d1)u(.,d0,d1/2,d1). (27)
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Reversing the order of summation, using (26) and assuming that utility
does not depend on events, but only on states, whih is true in the 421 round,
I obtain the Kolmogorov equation on the expeted utility:
u(.,d0) =
∑
d1
σ(.,d0 y d1)u(.,d0, ∗,d1). (28)
(By hypothesis, u does not depend on ∗.)
As opposed to the max−moy algorithm, (28) does not produe any de-
ision, but, given the mixed strategies P, p (eetive through σ), determines
the expetation of any utility, for whih P may not be optimal.
Nevertheless, if P is optimal, from (17) and (19), there is an equality,
between operators on u(.,d0,d1/2,d1):
max
d1
=
∑
d1
P (.,d0,d1/2,d1). (29)
Taking (29) into (27) returns (22).
3.2 The Fokker-Plank equation on presene density
I dene the state fate ψ ≡ (dj)j=0,1... (fate with only states, not events).
From (26),
P(ψ = (.,d0,d1)) = σ(.,d0 y d1)P(ψ = (.,d0)), (30)
so that the sequene of past states
(d0), (d0,d1), (d0,d1,d2) . . .
also is a Markov hain.
Summing (30) over all state fates onverging to the same state d at time
j + 1 gives the presene density ρj+1(d):
ρ0(d) = δd,d0 , (31)
∀j ∈ N, ρj+1(d) =
∑
d0...dj
P(ψ = (d0 . . .dj)). (32)
In the round, from (11), ρj is stationary, as soon as j ≥ J .
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I assume that utility is a funtion of state and time only, less general than
ausal (12):
u(. . .dJϕ) = uJϕ(dJϕ). (33)
The end-of-round utility is indeed of the kind (33), beause end-of-set ranking
(see the rules) only depends on round results, not on intermediary states and,
for the rst player, the eetive round duration.
For all player's optimal (or rational) mixed strategy P derived from a
utility of the kind (33),
Pj(dj,dj+1/2,dj+1) ≡ P (.,dj,dj+1/2,dj+1), (34)
σj(dj y dj+1) ≡ σ(.,dj y dj+1) (35)
Taking (33, 35) into (28) allows to extend (33) to all time (for the expeted
utility), by indution:
∀j ∈ N, uj(dj) ≡ u(. . .dj). (36)
The proess (j,dj ,dj+1/2) is Markovian.
The onsequene (35) of (33), taken into (32), allows to express ρj+1(dj+1)
as a funtional on ρj :
ρj+1(dj+1) =
∑
dj
ρj(dj)σj(dj y dj+1), (37)
the Fokker-Plank equation.
As opposed to (37), (28) does not need (33). Nevertheless, with (33),
(28), beomes
uj(dj) =
∑
dj+1
σj(dj y dj+1)uj+1(dj+1), (38)
adjoint to (37).
(37, 38) are the evolution equations, adjoint to eah other, linear, unsta-
tionary, of presene density and expeted utility. Their inputs are a player's
mixed strategy and utility.
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3.3 Computing result probabilities by duality
Let F ≡ F(B+(D),Q) be the spae of numerial funtions on B+(D), with
the salar produt
∀(f, g) ∈ F , 〈f, g〉 ≡
∑
d∈B+(D)
f(d)g(d). (39)
σj is an operator, a linear endomorphism on F , fully determined by the
Markovian matrix σj(d0 y d1). Its transposed operator is σ
t
j , of matrix
σtj(d1 y d0) ≡ σj(d0 y d1).
In operator notation, (37, 38) beome
ρj+1 = σ
t
jρj , uj = σjuj+1.
As σtj et σj are adjoint to eah other, the expeted utility follows a on-
servation law:
〈uj, ρj〉 = 〈σjuj+1, ρj〉 = 〈uj+1, σ
t
jρj〉 = 〈uj+1, ρj+1〉,
〈uj, ρj〉 = 〈u0, ρ0〉 = u0(d0). (40)
The last equality is a onsequene of (31). Given the player's mixed strategy
P , (40) holds for any utility.
The diret omputation of 〈uj, ρj〉 onsists in solving for ρj(dj) the Fokker-
Plank equation, whih must be repeated, to omplete the salar produt,
at least for all dj where uj does not vanish. More shrewdly, 〈uj, ρj〉 an be
omputed indiretly, as the r. h. s. of (40): the Kolmogorov equation is
solved only one for the expeted utility at the trunk of the fate tree, or the
initial expeted utility. The indiret omputation is faster than the diret
omputation, by a fator whih is the ardinal of the support of uj. The indi-
ret omputation benets from the uniity of the fate tree, and the diusive
growth of the support of uj.
Moreover, to obtain the Kolmogorov algorithm from the max−moy al-
gorithm, one merely has to replae, in (22), the operator max appearing at
the l. h. s. of (29), by the operator strat appearing at the r. h. s. of (29).
(These operators dier if P is not optimal.) The Kolmogorov equation is
thus solved by a strat−moy algorithm.
Here are examples of using the Kolmogorov equation and (40):
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1. The probability of the result to be in V ⊂ B+(D) (independently of
time) is the initial expetation of the stationary utility uj = χV .
2. The probability of Dj0 is the initial expetation of the utility uj =
δj,j0χ∂B+(D−Dj0 ).
3.4 Analogy with linear transport theory
The round is a linear transport phenomenon, with respet to the fae variable.
Fae, expeted utility, presene density, transition probability orrespond re-
spetively, in transport theory [14℄, to phase (position, veloity), importane
[15℄, ux and ross setion. Harris [16℄ shows that a monokineti partile
population grown by branhing (e. g. neutrons produed by nulear ssion)
follows a Galton-Watson proess. Similarly, in appendix B, I disuss the
Galton-Watson harater of the rst player's live die population Dj.
4 Simple optimal poliies for one-goal utilities
Taking for goal a unique ombination d∗ ∈ ∂B+(D), the utility is a binary
Kroneker funtion δd∗,. (modulo an ane transform), and optimal strategies
are simply onstruted.
4.1 The rathet and Bernoulli poliies
I examine two rst player's poliies, with a one-goal utility:
1. The Bernoulli poliy onsists in aumulating no die, unless the goal
has been attained (then, all die are aumulated); the ast sequene
is a stationary Bernoulli proess (a sequene of independent trials ter-
minated by suess or failure).
2. The rathet poliy onsists in putting aside as many die as possible,
ontributing to the goal:
∀(j ∈ N, j + 1 < J),dj+1 = d
∗ ∧ (dj + dj+1/2), (41)
Pj(dj ,dj+1/2,dj+1) = δdj+1,d∗∧(dj+dj+1/2). (42)
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(∧ is the inx notation of the minimum in the partially ordered spae ZF ,
generalizing, in Lagrangian notation, the ensemble intersetion ∩.)
The rathet strategy towards d∗ is optimal, with respet to the d∗-goal
utility, if and only if p dereases in B+(D). This means that as many die as
possible should be aumulated, in order to maximize the suess probability
at any future time. For unloaded die, from (1),
∀(d ∈ B+(F ),d+ e1 ∈ B
+(F )),
p(d+ e1)
p(d)
=
1
F
|d|+ 1
d1 + 1
≤ 1, (43)
i. e. p dereases on B+(F ). The rathet strategy is optimal if and only if
D ≤ F , stritly if and only if D < F .
For example, with D = 3 < F = 6, J > 1,d∗ = 421,d1/2 = 651, the
rathet deision (to aumulate 1) is optimal, beause p(421) < p(42) (it will
be easier to obtain 42 than 421). With D = 3 > F = 2,d∗ = 211,d1/2 = 222,
the Bernoulli deision (to replay all die) is optimal, beause p(11) = 1/F 2 =
2/8 < p(211) = 3/F 3 = 3/8. With D = F = 2,d∗ = 21,d1/2 = 11, both
Bernoulli and rathet deisions are optimal.
A next player's maximum round duration is imposed. In ase of a prema-
ture suess, he is in a dilemma, having to deide between equally unpleasant
ways of breaking the goal, obtained too early. For F > 2, optimal deisions
onsist in replaying any one die; the number of pure optimal strategies is thus
the number of distint faes in the goal ombination, at the power J − 1. If
the goal is a brelan, then no dilemma exists.
4.2 Optimal one-goal strategy result probabilities
For any strategy, I onsider the probability to obtain any result, e. g. 111
after three asts. Aording to setion 3.3, this probability is the initial
expeted utility, determined by the Kolmogorov equation and the nal on-
dition of a Kroneker utility on the result. This probability depends on the
player i = 1, 2 (rst or next), the (renormalized) maximum round duration
J1, the player's mixed strategy P , the delay j, and the result d:
pi(J1, P, j,d), 0 ≤ j ≤ J1 ≤ J,d ∈ B
+(D). (44)
The set of result probabilities, for all possible pure strategies and (D,F, J) =
(3, 6, 3), is (muh larger than the fate tree, itself very large and) too large
to be extensively listed. Thus, I will work on a redued strategy subset, for
4 SIMPLE OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR ONE-GOAL UTILITIES 16
whih a reasonable hoie is the set of optimal one-goal strategies, for all pos-
sible goals. As far as the goal determines the optimal strategy, the variable
P in (44) is simply replaed by the goal d∗:
pi(J1,d
∗, j,d), 0 ≤ j ≤ J1 ≤ J, (d,d
∗) ∈ B+(D)2 (45)
whih looks like the Markovian matrix of setion 3.3, exept that d∗ is not
atual, but ontemplated. There are diagonal (d = d∗) and non-diagonal
result probabilities.
For the rst player, the optimal one-goal strategy is unequivoally dened
by the goal (D < F : the rathet) and the funtion p1 is dened everywhere.
This in not true for p2, beause of dilemmas. However, next player diagonal
probabilities are unaeted by dilemmas, so that p2 is dened on the diagonal,
d = d∗; it is even dened for all (d∗,d), if and only if d∗ is a brelan, sine
brelans do not produe dilemma, as notied at end of setion 4.1.
Here are a few properties of the funtions pi:
pi(0,d
∗, 0,d) = δd∗,d, (46)
pi(J, 0, j, 0) = δj,0, (47)
pi(1,d
∗, 1,d) = p(d), (48)
pi(J,d
∗, j,d) = 0, j < J,d∗ 6= d,
p1(J,d, j,d) = pi(j,d, j,d), j < J,
p2(J,d
∗, j,d) = 0, j < J, (49)
∑
d∈∂B+(|d∗|)
J∑
j=0
p1(J,d
∗, j,d) = 1.
∑
d∈∂B+(|d∗|)
p2(j,Def , j,d) = 1.
Let the umulative diagonal probability be
si(J,d) ≡
J∑
j=1
pi(J,d, j,d). (50)
Beause of the next players' round duration ondition
∀J > 1, s1(J,d) > s2(J,d) = p2(J,d, J,d) > p1(J,d, J,d).
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To redue the pi omputational domain, I use invariane with respet
to fae permutations (for unloaded die). Firstly, diagonal probabilities de-
pend on only one ombination. As in (1), two ombinations are equivalent,
modulo the funtions d 7→ pi(J,d, j,d), for all (i, J, j), if and only if their
oupation numbers (Lagrangian omponents) form the same ombination,
e. g. 441 ∼ 655. With (D,F ) = (3, 6), the quotient set ontains three
lasses: that of brelans (∋ 111), that of sequenes (∋ 123)3, that of pairs
(∋ 112). Seondly, non-diagonal probabilities depend on a ouple of ombi-
nations. Two ouples of ombinations are equivalent, modulo the funtions
(d∗,d) 7→ pi(J,d
∗, j,d), for all (i, J, j), if and only if their ouples of ou-
pation numbers form the same ombination, e. g. (421, 442) ∼ (321, 211). A
fae permutation transforms a next player's optimal one-goal strategy into
another, possibly dierent if the goal is not a brelan.
Taking into aount (46) and fae permutation invariane, the result prob-
abilities (45) are omputed, for (D,F, J) = (3, 6, 3), by applying strat−moy
on optimal d∗-goal strategies and d-Kroneker utilities. As a onsequene
of self-similarity (23), the probabilities after the initial time (J1 < J), are
obtained as intermediary results in the omputation of a priori probabilities
(J1 = J). The results are presented in the probability harts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
(appendix C), whih do not ll more than a few pages thanks to the exten-
sive use of fae permutation invariane and other properties (46 . . . ). There
are 31 lasses of three-die ombination ouples (inluding the three diagonal
lasses).
5 Goal identiation programming
I will propose heuristi poliies, based on the global maximization of expeted
utility, with respet to the subset of optimal one-goal strategies, for whih
result probabilities were obtained in the last setion.
5.1 Motivation: bounded omplexity
The max−moy bakward indution algorithm is optimal, short, but the
number of numerial operations per time step, already large for (D,F, J) =
(3, 6, 3), is unbounded as a funtion of the maximum round duration J .
Information theory [17, 5℄ teahes that a message will be transmitted faster
3
I do not mean that all ombination in the lass of sequenes is a sequene.
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by a speialized ode. max−moy bakward indution is slow, for the general
reasons that it is unspeialized (and optimal).
To speed-up poliy, possibly at the expense of brevity and optimality,
speialization is neessary. For example, onsider the game of Nim [7,  1.3℄:
besides max−moy bakward indution, a stratagem is found, based on on-
gruene, produing optimal strategies, with a bounded number of operations
per time step. The rathet (D < F ) would be a stratagem of 421, if only the
goal were known.
I propose to identify the goal, rigorously, by onsidering not only the
utility, but also the result probabilities (45), obtained in setion 4. I will
obtain goal identiation heuristi poliies, that may be onsidered as quasi-
Markovian, from the remark following (45). Roughly, they transfer the om-
plexity of max−moy bakward indution to the result probabilities, with the
advantage that the latter an be ompiled one for all (and the inonveniene
that they must be remembered).
For a one-goal utility, goal identiation is simple. For a onstant utility,
as well: any goal is optimal. Diulties are thus with utilities somewhere
between peaked and at, fuzzy, e. g. with peaks of about the same height,
playing the roles of attrators, that one has to hoose between.
4
5.2 Redued horizon
I onsider a time and state dependent utility, as in (33, 36), in a round of
maximum duration J . d0 is the state at time j0 ≤ J . I dene the evaluation
funtion,
u∗0j0 (d0) ≡ max
d∗∈∂B+(D0)
J−j0∑
j=0
pi(J − j0,d
∗, j,d∗)uj0+j(d0 + d
∗), (51)
where j is the renormalized time and D0 = D − |d0|. Evaluation funtions
are often used in stage game (hess, othello, hekers . . . ) programming, but
they are usually dened empirially, unlike (51), whih is probabilisti.
To take into aount serendipity  that a result other than the goal may
be not so bad, after all  (51) is improved:
u∗1j0 (d0) ≡ max
d∗∈∂B+(D0)
J−j0∑
j=0
∑
d∈∂B+(D0)
p1(J − j0,d
∗, j,d)uj0+j(d0 + d), (52)
4
Like Buridan's donkey, starving from hesitating between bushels of oats and water.
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whih annot be used for next players, beause of dilemmas. For all d0 ∈
∂B+(D), onsidering (47), the evaluation funtions (51, 52) simply return
the utility.
max−moy bakward indution is partiularly slow, beause it needs to
ompletely analyze the round even before its rst deision. Hene the idea
that short-sighted poliies may be faster. At time j0 ∈ N, a horizon h ∈ N
may be hosen, suh that j1 = j0 + h ≤ J , and the round is virtually
terminated at j1, taking for ersatz utility the evaluation funtion u
∗s
j1 given
by (51) or (52), depending on the serendipity bit s ∈ {0, 1}. With j1 = J−1,
onsidering (48), (52) reprodues the deepest max−moy iteration, so that
an optimal strategy is generated.
I will further examine h = 0, 1. With h = 0, the goal is found by max-
imizing u∗sj0 , independently of the rst event. With h = 1, as there is no
interest in thinking before asting the die, the deision d1 is rather taken
after the rst event d1/2, aording to
max
d1
u∗sj0+1(d1). (53)
In ase of many optimal deisions in (53), the orresponding states, written
as inreasing Lagrangian lists, e. g. 124, are disriminated aording to the
lexiographi order (only pure strategies are generated). In ase of many
optimal goals in (51) or (52), we need not disriminate between them, and
the poliy reprodues the human harater of dupliity. Dilemma implies
dupliity, but the onverse is false.
5.3 Dynami programming and goal revision
The strategy may be revised to take into aount new events, whih is an
instane of dynami programming [18℄ or belief revision [19℄, realizing a feed-
bak of fate on strategy. By self-similarity of the round, a poliy may be
applied at any time, with suitable parameter renormalization. Self-similar
revision based on the max−moy bakward indution poliy would just on-
rm the optimal strategy, omputed a priori: it is therefore useless. Only
fallible poliies are worth revising.
A heuristi poliy of horizon h ≥ 1 foreasts, at any given time, only the
next h deisions. Thus, it must be run with the period at least h. The revised
serendipitous goal identiation poliy of horizon h is optimal in its last h
deisions. The goal identiation poliy with h = 0 does not require revision
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Table 1: 123 one-goal utility
u0r = 0.22811 u0/u0r
poliy player
horizon serendip. rst next
0 0 1 0.57858
0 1 1
1 0 1 0.57858
1 1 1
max−moy 1 0.57858
and is very simple (short and fast). It may be the only rational poliy, simple
enough for unaided human players in normal game onditions.
5.4 Poliy benhmark and interpretation
For (D,F, J) = (3, 6, 3), I onsider a few inreasingly fuzzy stationary utili-
ties:
1. u = δ123, a one-goal utility,
2. u = δ123 + δ224 + δ345, a three-goal utility,
3. u = t, the transfer funtion dened by table 5 in appendix,
4. the sum of faes.
These utilities are unrealisti, in the sense that they may not be possible
within a real 421 set (see setion 2.3). I onsider the poliies: max−moy
bakward indution, and the four goal identiation poliies (h, s) ∈ {0, 1}2;
the h = 0 poliies are without revision.
From the nal utility, on the leaves of the fate tree, every poliy yields
a pure strategy, and its initial expeted utility u0, on the trunk, is obtained
by solving the Kolmogorov equation exatly, with the strat−moy algorithm.
Optimality is dened as the ratio of the expeted utility, over the rst player
optimal expeted utility u0r. The numerial results (approximated by dei-
mal numbers) are opied from [20℄ into the tables 1, 2, 3, 4.
Table 1 onrms that for a one-goal utility, all goal identiation poli-
ies are by denition optimal. Compared to the rst player, next players
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Table 2: 123, 224, 345 three-goal utility
u0r = 0.32805 u0/u0r
poliy player
horizon serendip. rst next
0 0 0.73037 0.43734
0 1 0.73037
1 0 0.97777 0.47746
1 1 0.98657
max−moy 1 0.49152
Table 3: utility = transfer funtion
u0r = 3.7467 u0/u0r
poliy player
horizon serendip. rst next
0 0 0.90834 0.68812
0 1 0.90834
1 0 0.87962 0.68991
1 1 0.99634
max−moy 1 0.77663
Table 4: utility = sum of faes
u0r = 14 u0/u0r
poliy player
horizon serendip. rst next
0 0 0.94194 0.92599
0 1 0.96418
1 0 0.75 0.85875
1 1 0.99900
max−moy 1 0.97321
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are handiapped, but less with a fuzzier utility. The numerial results show
a positive ontribution of serendipity, muh greater with the greater hori-
zon and revision. The ontribution of horizon and revision is positive with
serendipity. Without serendipity, the ontribution of horizon and revision is
positive for peaked utilities, negative for fuzzy utilities (3, 4).
I take advantage of this eet to give a (less fuzzy) denition of fuzzi-
ness: a utility is fuzzy if and only if introduing horizon and revision with-
out serendipity ontributes negatively to its expetation. Thus, I have on-
struted fuzzy utilities, for whih introduing horizon and revision dereases
the expeted utility, even though it is more omplex. The response of ex-
peted utility with respet to omplexity is non-inreasing (this eet om-
pares, in eletriity, with a negative resistane).
6 Conlusions
The mathematis of fate in 421 leave as the only unsolved diulty bifur-
ations, that maximizing the expeted utility does not always determine a
unique deision, as in next players' dilemmas. Here is a toy example: a game
with three players, P, A, B. If P says white, then A gives one euro to B; if P
says blak, then B gives one euro to A. P earns nothing anyway; A, B take
no deision. Maximizing P's expeted utility does not determine its deision.
Introduing a mixed strategy amounts to onsider P as a random generator,
with unknown probabilities. A lassi postulate of statistial theories is to
maximize the entropy or missing information [10, 17℄, whih here sets the
probabilities of either outome to 1/2. Are the postulates of mixed strategy
and maximum entropy so easily aeptable? We annot exlude hidden de-
terminism or bias in P. For example, P may always hoose the rst answer
in the lexiographi order (blak), or P may have a seret agreement with A
to share his gain.
Bounded omplexity, similar to bounded rationality in [21℄, motivates
heuristi poliies, where haraters lose to atual human behavior are found,
in agreement with [22℄. These haraters are fate, dilemma, goal identia-
tion and revision, restrited horizon, serendipity, dupliity and pani. When
the poliy belongs to an organization, we are in management. When an in-
dividual deides for himself, we are in psyhology. For example, the same
mathematial eet is behind ounterprodutive management or pani.
Goal identiation onsumes a bounded number of operations per time
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step, whatever the round duration, beause it does not resolve all deisions
in the fate tree, but only those whih are ompatible with the present state,
and before the horizon. Goal identiation is not generally optimal, as op-
posed to a ommon assertion in business ourses. Only max−moy bakward
indution, whih has no goal, just like random playing, is generally optimal.
In the round, the rathet stratagem allows the immediate translation from
goal to deision. I used probability theory as the logi of goal identiation,
à la Jaynes [11℄. Complexity hides in the result probabilities, to be ompiled
before playing, as a kind of training.
Depending on omplexity resoures and utility, poliies may be variably
appliable or good. Starting from a given poliy, one may inrease optimality,
by modifying its haraters or the utility: this is the task of human resoures
management, when the poliy is that of an individual taking deisions for
a ompany, a manager. The short-sighted manager (h = 0) gets hardly
any help from serendipity. The unserendipitous manager should avoid fuzzy
utilities and favor preise goal assignments. I obtain examples of ounterpro-
dutive management: with a fuzzy utility and no serendipity, goal revision
dramatially redues the optimality. The role of serendipity was pointed out,
on purely qualitative ground, by N. Wiener, about sienti and tehnial
invention [23℄. The present work also pertains to Wiener's ybernetis.
Rationality an be further redued. At the extreme, the fool manager
an be trusted only for a at utility. The study of irrational or illogial but
atual behavior is the task of sophistry [24℄. It may be quite useful in game
pratie, to produe best responses.
I thank researhers of the GREQAM in Marseilles, for fruitful disussions.
A The (tentative) rules of 421
I dene the game, from oral tradition and [25, 26℄. The hardware onsists
of three die and eleven tokens, initially in a pot. There are two or more
players who an always see the positions of die and tokens.
In the rst part of the game, the harge, players get tokens from the pot.
In the seond part of the game, the disharge, players get tokens from eah
other. A player wins when he gets no token during the harge (many players
may thus win), or when he rst gets rid of his tokens during the disharge.
The harge or disharge is a sequene of sets. In every set, eah player
at his turn plays a round against the die, while the others wait. The ative
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Table 5: token transfer funtion
highest ombination token number
421 10
111 7
f11, fff, f 6= 1 f
sequene 2
other 1
player asts the die up to three times; after every ast, he an put aside
any number of die, thus aumulating a ombination. Next players must
ast die as many times as the rst player.
5
End-of-round aumulated om-
binations, obtained by all players in the set, are ranked in the hierarhi
order
421 ≻ 111 ≻ 611 ≻ 666 ≻ 511 ≻ 555 ≻ 411 ≻ 444 ≻ 311
≻ 333 ≻ 211 ≻ 222 ≻ 654 ≻ 543 ≻ 432 ≻ 321 ≻ 665 ≻ . . . 221, (54)
where ≻means `higher than'. The ombinations, impliit in (54), are ordered
as the numbers formed by their faes in a dereasing sequene: e. g. 655 ≻
654. The dominant ombination 421 and the dominated ombination 221,
known as nénette, dier only by one die. fff is the f -brelan, f11 is the
f -pair (f 6= 1), 654, 543, 432, 321 are the sequenes.
At end of set, the last
6
player who has got the lowest ombination gets the
number of tokens determined by table 5, e. g. if the highest ombination is
411, then the last player with the lowest ombination (whatever it is) gets 4
tokens. During the harge, tokens are taken from the pot, if possible. When
the pot is empty, the disharge begins, and tokens are now taken from the
player who has got the highest ombination.
5
The order of players in the set matters, but I ould not nd denite rules for its
determination.
6
The adjetive `last' is my own suggestion for automati tie-breaking.
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B A Galton-Watson proess in the 421 round
Taking the genealogi point of view, eah die is onsidered as an individual,
dying after being ast, either without a hild, in ase of aumulation, or
with a single hild (itself indeed). The hild number being lower than one,
the number of live die Dj (setion 3.3) dereases in time. Moreover, the
population beomes extint after J asts (or sooner).
A Galton-Watson proess [16℄ is obtained when the ospring of eah in-
dividual is independent of others'. With an optimal d∗-goal strategy, the
die dying without hildren have their faes in d∗, but the onverse is not
true. For example, with d∗ = 221,d1 = 211, J > 1, the two die 11 have
orrelated ospring: one has a hild if and only if the other has none. Die
have independent ospring if and only if d∗ is a brelan and the player is rst.
I apply the Galton-Watson theory [12, 6.2℄ to obtain the probability law
of Dj, for an optimal d
∗
-goal strategy, where d∗ = DeF is the F -brelan. Die
are indexed by d = 1 . . .Dj . Let Zd ∈ {0, 1} the number of hildren of the
die indexed by d.
Dj =
Dj−1∑
d=1
Zd. (55)
The Zd are random variables, with the same law qi ≡ P(Zd = i), of generating
funtion
g(z) ≡ 〈zZd〉 = q0 + q1z, q0 =
1
F
, q1 = 1− q0.
The Zd are always independent if and only if d
∗
is a brelan and the
player is rst. When this is true, from (55), the generating funtion of Dj ,
onditioned by Dj−1, is
〈zDj |Dj−1 = d〉 = g(z)
d.
The generating funtion of Dj is thus determined by
g0(z) = z
D, gJ(z) = 1,
∀(j, 1 ≤ j < J), gj(z) ≡ 〈z
Dj〉 =
D∑
d=0
〈zDj |Dj−1 = d〉P(Dj−1 = d)
=
D∑
d=0
P(Dj−1 = d)g(z)
d = gj−1 ◦ g(z).
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By indution,
gj = g0 ◦ g
◦j .
The omposition powers of the ane funtion g are
g◦j(z) = 1− qj1 + q
j
1z.
Therefore
gj(z) = (1− q
j
1 + q
j
1z)
D,
P(Dj = d) =
(
D
d
)
(1− qj1)
D−dqjd1 . (56)
Dj follows a binomial law, diretly obtained by onsidering that a die
dies when aumulated, or stays alive, with the probability q1 per time step,
independently of others: a Bernoulli proess is obtained, with the law (56).
The interest of onsidering a Galton-Watson proess is in the analogy with
branhing proesses [16℄.
C Realization with mathematia
The present artile is supported by [20℄, an open soure software and data
base in the mathematia language [27℄, whih, like LISP, is interpreted and
allows funtional and reursive treatments on arbitrary expressions, equiva-
lent to trees. The mathematia frontend allows literate programming [28℄ in
the form of notebooks, gathering live ode, outputs and omments, within a
tree struture, that an be unfolded at will.
Combination manipulation diers slightly from list manipulation (sine
order does not matter in ombinations) or ensemble manipulation (sine repe-
titions are allowed in ombinations). A tool box is developed. The numerial
parameters (D,F, J) are arbitrary, whih realizes a salable model, invalu-
able for development. Fate trees are reated reursively. All fates onverging
to the same state at the same time are merged by indexing, so that the
size grows only linearly with the depth J and remains easily manageable for
(D,F, J) = (3, 6, 3). In exhange, the omputing time is inreased and the
history is lost, whih allows to treat only time and state dependent utilities
(as required in the 421 set).
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Starting from the leaves of the fate tree, where utility is grafted, opti-
mal strategies and expeted utilities are build reursively, aording to the
max−moy algorithm. A utility-strategy tree is nally obtained, from whih
the strategy an be extrated, then piped into the strat−moy algorithm, a
variation on max−moy, solving the Kolmogorov equation.
max−moy produes the expeted optimal one-goal strategies, Bernoulli
or rathet, depending on D < F , and dilemmas. The result probabilities
are omputed, saved, and many properties are heked systematially. Some
result probabilities are heked by Monte Carlo simulations, with suess.
The harts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 are generated automatially. There is very little
room for errors, and if there are any, they are traeable.
The goal identiation heuristi poliies are realized. Their wrong dei-
sions are pointed out. They are exatly evaluated with strat−moy, whih
is very slow, sine it requires the omputation of every heuristi deision in
the fate tree, aording to an algorithm atually longer and slower, for one
deision, than the simple maximization in max−moy. Obtaining the truth
about heuristi poliies is a lengthy task.
Probability harts player's guide
p1, p2 mean rst or next players. In every box of a diagonal probability
hart stands a olumn of the probabilities, ordered from top to bottom by
growing delay, to obtain the goal written at head of line.
In every box of a non-diagonal probability hart, stand two olumns: at
left, from top to bottom, the goal and the result; at right, the probabil-
ities, ordered from top to bottom by growing delay, to obtain the result,
with the goal in mind (and taking optimal deisions as determined by the
rathet). Moreover, for easy aess, the ouples (goal, result) are represented
in a square array, where heads of lines and olumns are the respetive rep-
resentatives of goal and result, modulo fae permutations (setion 4.2). The
three-die representative 3X3 array is spread onto the three harts 8, 9, 10,
one for eah goal lass.
Here is an example for using non-diagonal harts. Let the goal be 641
and the result 652. The representatives of 641 and 655 are, separately and
respetively, 123 and 112. (Representatives are hosen so as to minimize the
sum of their faes.) The representative of the ouple (641, 655) is (123, 144).
123 takes us to hart 10 (the third line of the representative square array),
whene 112 takes us to the seond olumn, (123, 144) to the third row, where
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nally are the probabilities to obtain, with the goal 641, the result 652, after
one, two or three asts.
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Table 6: diagonal result probabilities
p1 p2
1
1

6
= 0.1667
5

36
= 0.1389
1

6
= 0.1667
1

6
= 0.1667
p1 p2
11
1

36
= 0.02778
85

1296
= 0.06559
1

36
= 0.02778
91

1296
= 0.07022
12
1

18
= 0.05556
35

324
= 0.108
1

18
= 0.05556
19

162
= 0.1173
p1 p2
111
1

216
= 0.00463
1115

46656
= 0.0239
466075

10077696
= 0.04625
1

216
= 0.00463
1151

46656
= 0.02467
513991

10077696
= 0.051
112
1

72
= 0.01389
143

2592
= 0.05517
23681

279936
= 0.08459
1

72
= 0.01389
149

2592
= 0.05748
26903

279936
= 0.0961
123
1

36
= 0.02778
227

2592
= 0.08758
21043

186624
= 0.1128
1

36
= 0.02778
239

2592
= 0.09221
24631

186624
= 0.132
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Table 7: rst player's non-diagonal result probabilities
1
1
1
2
1

6
=0.1667
5

36
=0.1389
11 12
11
11
22
1

36
=0.02778
25

1296
=0.01929
11
23
1

18
=0.05556
25

648
=0.03858
11
12
1

18
=0.05556
55

648
=0.08488
12
12
33
1

36
=0.02778
1

81
=0.01235
12
11
1

36
=0.02778
35

648
=0.05401
12
34
1

18
=0.05556
2

81
=0.02469
12
13
1

18
=0.05556
43

648
=0.06636
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(
1
)
111 112 123
111
111
222
1

216
=0.00463
125

46656
=0.002679
15625

10077696
=0.00155
111
223
1

72
=0.01389
125

15552
=0.008038
15625

3359232
=0.004651
111
122
1

72
=0.01389
275

15552
=0.01768
56875

3359232
=0.01693
111
112
1

72
=0.01389
605

15552
=0.0389
207025

3359232
=0.06163
111
234
1

36
=0.02778
125

7776
=0.01608
15625

1679616
=0.009303
111
123
1

36
=0.02778
275

7776
=0.03537
56875

1679616
=0.03386
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L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
W
I
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H
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b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
(
2
)
111 112 123
112
112
333
1

216
=0.00463
1

729
=0.001372
8

19683
=0.0004064
112
222
1

216
=0.00463
215

23328
=0.009216
20605

2519424
=0.008178
112
111
1

216
=0.00463
205

11664
=0.01758
16105

629856
=0.02557
112
334
1

72
=0.01389
1

243
=0.004115
8

6561
=0.001219
112
233
1

72
=0.01389
31

2592
=0.01196
839

93312
=0.008991
112
133
1

72
=0.01389
5

486
=0.01029
38

6561
=0.005792
112
223
1

72
=0.01389
77

3888
=0.0198
7039

419904
=0.01676
112
113
1

72
=0.01389
103

3888
=0.02649
6499

209952
=0.03095
112
122
1

72
=0.01389
91

1944
=0.04681
28219

419904
=0.0672
112
345
1

36
=0.02778
2

243
=0.00823
16

6561
=0.002439
112
234
1

36
=0.02778
31

1296
=0.02392
839

46656
=0.01798
112
134
1

36
=0.02778
5

243
=0.02058
76

6561
=0.01158
112
123
1

36
=0.02778
37

648
=0.0571
10217

139968
=0.073
CR
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3
3
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p
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-
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(
3
)
111 112 123
123
123
444
1

216
=0.00463
1

1728
=0.0005787
1

13824
=0.00007234
123
111
1

216
=0.00463
83

15552
=0.005337
3115

1119744
=0.002782
123
445
1

72
=0.01389
1

576
=0.001736
1

4608
=0.000217
123
112
1

72
=0.01389
179

5184
=0.03453
15067

373248
=0.04037
123
144
1

72
=0.01389
101

15552
=0.006494
3277

1119744
=0.002927
123
114
1

72
=0.01389
175

15552
=0.01125
6311

1119744
=0.005636
123
456
1

36
=0.02778
1

288
=0.003472
1

2304
=0.000434
123
145
1

36
=0.02778
101

7776
=0.01299
3277

559872
=0.005853
123
124
1

36
=0.02778
319

7776
=0.04102
24239

559872
=0.04329
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